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PRIVATIZATION OF SPACE VENTURES: PROPOSING A
PROVEN REGULATORY THEORY FOR FUTURE
EXTRATERRESTRIAL ApPROPRIATION

l. INTRODUCTION
SpaceShipOne secured its place in history in late 2004 as the first
commercially developed aircraft to enter outer space when it soared, for the
second time within a week, to an altitude of more than one hundred kilometers. l
Aerospace pioneer Burt Rutan designed and built SpaceShipOne to compete for
the Ansari X Prize, a ten million dollar purse awarded to the first team to pilot a
privately built vehicle to an altitude of one hundred kilometers twice within two
weeks." If the aircraft and its capabilities were not impressive enough, Ruton
built SpaceShipOne for approximately twenty million dollars-a bargain
compared to NASA built vehicles.'
Shortly after SpaceShipOne captured the Ansari X prize, Virgin Atlantic
licensed the technology for a new enterprise called "Virgin Galactic."4 Within
five years, Virgin Galactic plans to offer flights to outer space at the price of twohundred thousand dollars per passenger.5

1 Leonard Da\'id, ,)j!(lc(!Slllj)()"" If/'lls S 10 ivfillioll AlISari X Pri::{! ill lIistoric 211t! Trip to SPIICC,
SPACF,COM, Oct. 4, 2004, http://www.spaec.conllmissionlaul1ches/xprize2 success 041004.html (last visited
Apr. 13,2(05) [hereinafter SpaceSitipOIl(,].

2 Sc(' SI}(/C('SllljJOIIC,

Slipi'll

110te

I.

3 Robert Roy Britt, NAS.1 Plalls Casit Pri::cs ill Wake! ofSIJace!SitipOllc SIICC(,SS, SPACE.COM, June
23, 2004, http://www.spaee.eolllinewsinasa prizes 040623.htllll (last visited Apr. 13, 20(5).
4 It!,
5 Virgill Gaillctic to Of",r Pllhlic Sjwcc Fligitts. SPAtE.COM, Sept. 27. 2004, http://www.spaee.eomi
missioniaunches/virgin spaee 040927.htmi (last visited Apr. 13,2(05) [hereinafter Vi/gilt Ga/llctic].
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Bigelow Aerospace recently announced a competition similar to the
Ansari X Prize-a fifty million dollar purse to be awarded to the first team to
',;

design and build a spacecraft capable of docking with an inflatable space station

.

'"

orbiting 160 kilometers above the earth's surface. 6 The company purchased the
technology and patent rights to the inflatable space station from NASA, which
did not have the funding to continue research and development. When Bigelow
finishes what NASA could not, it will have a space station that will weigh only
20,000 to 23,000 kilograms and intlate to 13.7 meters long and 6.7 meters in
diameter. 7 Bigelow Aerospace plans to usc the station for commercial purposes
such as research, tourism, and industrial production. x NASA itself also plans to
join in the prize incentive development game started by private industry.
eo·

Although NASA is a government entity, it has also decided to encourage private
space ventures by planning to offer cash prizes as high as thirty million dollars.9
NASA plans to award projects capable of a wide variety of tasks, from orbiting
the earth to collecting moon rocks. IO Although not an exhaustive list, these
examples are sufficient to illustrate how privately funded ventures into space are
not only becoming practicable but more importantly, profitable. Many companies
envision the enormous commercial demand that access to space may bring. I I
(, Tariq Malik. Ni'll' S50 Ali/lioll I'ri~e fiJi' I'ri"lIte Orhitillg .'>iJilu!cmfi. SPA.l'Ll'OM. Sept. 27. 2004.
http://www.space.col11il11issionlaunches/bigclowspaceprizc040927.html( last visited Apr. 13. 20(5).
7 Leonard David. Bige/o\\' .1el"Oslwce to Tack/e /Ilf/OW"/C SiJilcC I/llhita/s. SPAlL-COM. May 24. 2004
htlp://www.spacc.coll1/newsibusincssll1onuay 040S24.htll1l (last visited Apr. 13. 20(5) I hcreinattcr Space
Habitatsj.

XIll.
9 See Britt, supra note 3 (explaining that the legislation for NASA's proposal is pending in Congress)
10 John F. Schuessler, Prir'ate Sector 11I1'II/r'elll<'lIt ill the Siwc£' I'rogmlll: SOllie Thillgs to COllsida
(May 200 I). htlp:l/www.bigc!owacrospucc.col11lschucsslcr-pvt-scclor.doc (last \'isilCd Apr. 13. 200S).
II Id.
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Although space tourism enjoys the most publication, incrcased space access also
has the potential to benefit other commercial applications as well. 12
The government alone, through programs and entities like NASA, cannot
satisfy the commercial demands for space-related activities. Until recently the
Columbia shuttle disaster caused NASA to ground its entire shuttle fleet. U Given
the mismatch between government supply and commercial demand, privately
funded ventures offer a golden key to unlocking the vast potential of space
related commerce.
Unfortunately, current international space conventions are a roadblock to
privatization of space activity. These conventions impose restraints on the
development, alienability, and appropriation of outer spacc. These conventions
ignore the realities of our ultra-competitive capitalistic global society where
some corporations enjoy larger annual revenues than the gross national product
of many small countries. Rather, it seems these conventions were formulated for
an idealistic world that has yet to materialize. Although idealism has its place, the
international community must develop laws governing space appropriation.
Moreover, the development of such laws must utilize established principles of
property law, capitalism,14 and equity.
12 !d Bristol-Myers Squibb, fi)r example. has fillllld that rroduction rates for the cancer fighting
antibiotic actinomycin [) arc 75",j, faster in space than on earth. Additionally, research has shown that growing
semiconductor crystals in sracc yiclds crystals of llluch higher quality than thosc grown on Earth. These
supcrior crystals have the potential to greatly imrrove arplications utilizing eomruter chips. !d.
13 Tariq Malik. iVAS.·j Pre"lIre., fiJI' FlIfll/"(! Risk, CNN.(OM, Oct. 29, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/
2004,TECIVspacc i I O!29/nasa.risk/indcx.html (last visited Apr. 13. 2005 I.
14 The terms "capitalist" and .. tree market" arc used here interchangeably. By so doing, there is no
intent to suggest a illisse:-jili!"e outer space economy with little or no governmental restraints. Rather, I refer to
the devclopment of the current capitalist structure that entails illfer alill, mass import and exror!. frec trade or
low tariff trade. traditional property jurisprudence. reliance on contract law, privatization of industry, and
regulatory governmental controls.
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Although the establishment of a body of space law ("corpus jllris
,\patialis") for outer spaee appropriation may seem premature, it is not. Justice

William Brennan, Jr. of the United States Supreme Court observed, "I won't see
the day when a code of laws for space communities will become an urgent
necessity. Perhaps few of you may sec that day. But we can be glad that responsible quarters are beginning to give thought to the law and space communities."15
Indeed, now is the time to lay a solid foundation for the laws that will eventually
govern outer space.
This note addresses the current treaties' inadequacies to accommodate
the increased privatization of outer space venture, and the limited role of states.
The current body of space law, on which these treaties are based, is flawed
because it relies on a philosophy of common ownership ("res ('o/lll11ll11is"). While
res comlllunis exists as an important intellectual idea for philosophical debate, it

is incongruent with the market conditions that will facilitate appropriation of
celestial bodies. Ultimately, states must abandon these treaties based on res
C01llfllUilis because of their inability to work in tandem with the emerging realities

of privately funded extraterrestrial appropriation and expansion. In short, the
international community must find a new framework for

CO/PllS

jllris ,\patia/is

that will encourage and facilitate appropriation activities in outer space.

15 Lawrence L. Risley. All FWlllilllllioll o/Ihe Need 10 AIlli!//(/5j)({ce L(/)\' 10 Pmleel II", Pril'ale
Exp/orer ill Oilier Space. 26 W. Sl. U. L. Rl\. 47. 67 (1999) (quoting William .I. Brennan. Jr.. Space
C%lliallioll alld Ihe Lall', 3 HAR\,. .l.L. & TH'II. 7. 12 (1990)),
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As an alternative to the current corpus juris spatialis based on res
COI11I11 1111 is, this note proposes a corplls jllris spatia/is derived fr0111 property

jurisprudence that has effectively and efficiently worked under the pressures of
an international market over the past millennia. Under this proposed cOI]Jllsjuris

,\patialis a posteriori,16 extraterrestrial acquisition and appropriation would
require three clements: (1) discovery; (2) claim; and (3) possession.
Under this new corplls juris spatialis a natural or juridical person could
meet the requirements for sufficient discovery, by acquiring a charter from a
granting state. Both developed and developing states would negotiate these
charters based on their respective needs and obligations, and would abide by
bilateral and multilateral treaties designed to ensure appropriate environmental
and humanitarian standards. In order to make a claim, a state would put the rest
of the world on sufficient notice of the state's intent to acquire land. Satisfaction
of the first two requirements, discovcry and claim, would create an inchoate title
that would then be perfected by possession, which would consist of sovereign
acts for a prescriptive period. These formulated requirements, based in part on
norms that governed the Age of Discovery, possess a foundation of realistic
notions of humankind's demonstrated self-interest; yet they provide an ordered
and equitable means of extraterrestrial appropriation and distribution to both
developed and developing countries.

1hAdrian Copiz, 5;ca/"cit\, ill 'simcl': Till' 11I(l'rllatiolla/ R('gll/alioll of Satl'lIil('.I', 10 C()\1ML~\\
CO'lSPfLTIIS

207, 21 X 23 (2002)
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FAILURES OF TilE OUTER SPACE TREATY, MOON TREATY, AND RES
COJfMUNlS DOGMA

Both the Outer Space!7 and Moon Treaties!X arose out of the ideal
common heritage of mankind ("CHM") principle.!Y The CHM concept states that
no one person or state owns designated international "common heritage"
regions. 20 Accordingly, the international community manages and administers
designated areas pursuant to international agreements. 21 Therefore, state
sovereignty, including its attendant powers, beneiits, and responsibilities,
remains non-cxistcnt in these areas. 22 Generally, the CHM principle adhercs to
the following: "( I) thc common hcritage arca is not subject to appropriation; (2)
all states share in the area's resource managcmcnt; (3) statcs must share the
benefits derived from cxploitation of area resources; and (4) the common
heritage area must be dedicated to peaceful purposes exelusivcly."23
The Outcr Space Treaty, although not expressly incorporating the CHM
principle, clearly entails CHM application because it disallows state appropri-

17 Treaty on Principles Governing thc Activitics of Stales in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, "I'elled 10,. sigllol",.e Jan. 27, I <)(,7, 18 U.S.T. 2410,610
U.N.T.S.205 Ihereinatler Outer Space Treatyl.
18 Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and other Celestial Hodies, opmed
Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. Jlhcreinailer Moon Treatyl.

!iJl' sigllalllr('

19 S'ee gel/i!ralh' Jennifer Frakes, Note, The C'OIiIl/1011 Ilerilage 01 Mallkilld P,.illciple ({lid Ihe D(,l!p
S(,(I"('(I. Ollll!" Sj}([c(', alld Allla,.clica: lVill Dn'l!lop('(1 (1//(1 /}n'elopillg Naliolls Rc({ch a ('oll/proll/ise:), 21 WIS.
IN \'\. L..1. 409, 42125 (2003); Eric Husby, So 1'ereiglltl , (///d l'rojiertl' Rig/IlS ill Oilier 5/)(/('1!, 3 n.eL. 1. INT'L
L. & PRAl . 359, 366 70 ( 1994); Harminderpal Singh Rana, Note, Thl! "( '011/11/011 Ilerilage 01 Mallkiwl" & The
Filial Frolllier: A Rcm/llalioll oj I ,i/III!S CO/l.l/illllillg Ih" I1llel"l/(/liO//(/1 Legal Regill/e lor O"ler Simce ACli1'ilies,
26 Rli fl;t,RS L..I. 225, 228 31 (1994): Kelly M. Zullo, No!e, Th" N""d 10 C/al"l/l/hl! Slallls o(Proper/l' Righls
ill lllier//(/liollol Spacl! LOll', 90 CiF(). L.J. 2413,2423 (2()02).
20 Rana, ,I'llI'm note 19. at 228 31.
11 SI!I! id.

22 SI'I! id.
23 Id. at 229 30.
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ation and designates celestial bodies for scientific and peaceful purposes. 24 The
Moon Treaty, bolder in its approach, expressly designates the moon and its
resources as "common heritage of all mankind."25
Although useful in philosophical discussion, res comll1unis ideology
encounters significant problems when it leaves the philosophical and enters into
the post-cold war era. Res communis only exists in reality within narrowlydefined subgroups that make a poor analogy to the complex international
dynamics of outer space appropriation. This note seeks to demonstrate that a

24 Outer Space Treaty. ,I'llI'm note 17. art. I. That article provides:
The exploration and use of outer space. including the moon and
other celestial bodies. shall be carried out for the benctit and in the
interests of all countries. irrespective of their degree of economic
or scientilic development. and shall be the province of all
mankind. Outer space. including the moon and other eeicstial
bodies. shall be free /()r exploration and usc by all States without
discrimination of any kind. on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law. and there shall be li'ee access to
all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of scientilic
investigation in outer space. including the moon and other celestial
bodies. and States shall lacilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.
25 Moon Treaty. ,I'llI'm note I X. arts. 6. II (I). Article II (I) of the Moon Treaty provides: "'The moon
and its natural resources arc the common heritage of mankind." Article 6 states:
I. There shall be fi'eedom of scientific investigation on the l1100n
by all States Parties without discrimination of any kind. on the
basis of equality and in accordance with international law.
2. In carrying out seientilic investigations and in furtherance of the
provisions of this Agreement. the States Parties shall have the right
to colicct on and remove Irom the 11100n S<lInplcs of its mineral and
other substances. Sueh samples shall remain at the disposal of
those States Parties whieh caused them to be collected and may be
used by them for scientilic purposes. States Parties shall have
regard to the desirability of making a rortion of such samrles
available to other interested States Parties and the international
scientilic community II)r scicntilic investigation. Statcs Parties
may in the course of scientific investigations also usc mineral and
other substances of the moon in quantities appropriate for the
surport of their missions.
3. States Parties agree on the desirability of exchanging scientilic
and other personnel on expeditions to or im,tallations on the moon
to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.
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complcte non-owncrship ("res l1ullius") approach to property cndowment would
avoid many of the philosophical quandaries of future outer space appropriation.

A. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was developed under intcmational
political, economic, and social conditions that were vastly different from what
they are today.26 Russia launched Sputnik one year prior to the formation of the
United Nation's committee that drafted the Outer Space Treaty.n Strong
centralized govemments carried out space activities to prove their technological
superiority over rival nations without any realizable profit and without any
feasibility of exploiting celestial bodies in outer space. At the time, private
companies nevcr planned on creating an orbiting hotel or timeshare, or providing
commercial excursions into outer space, nor did they contemplate building
spacecraft, space rockets, or even satellites. Even the imagined privatization of
space failed to materialize in any meaningful way.2S
Undcr these circumstances, the Outer Space Treaty was ratified by more
than ninety nations and signed by twenty-seven, including the United States. 29
Owing to its overwhelming support in the intemational community, many
consider the Outcr Space Treaty international space law. JO
The Outer Space Treaty explicitly forbids the appropriation of celestial
bodies, even by a developed country funding the majority of space exploration

26 Sic''' Frakes,
27 !d. at 422.

n

Sel!

note 19. at 421.

iii. at 421; Zullo,

29 s"t! Frakes,
30 St!" Zullo,
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and discovery, as follows: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is not suhject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means."11 In connection with this, the Outer
Space Treaty does not recognize a right to exclude others from appropriated
property:
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of
celestial bodies. 12
The Treaty mandates that
[t]he exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind."
Under this language, developed nations, which provide the majority of
funding for space exploration, will realize the same pecuniary benefit as those
countries that make no investment in spaee exploration whatsoever. Interestingly,
some developed countries have since interpreted the provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty to limit or defeat its purpose. 14 For example, when the United States
ratified the Outer Space Treaty, it interpreted the anti-appropriation clause
loosely: "[T]he understanding of the Committee on Foreign Relations [is] that
nothing in Article I diminishes or alters the right ofthe United States to determine

31 It!. art. 2.

32 Outer Spaee Treaty . .'''Jim note 17. art. I.

33 Iii.
34 1d.
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how ... it shares the benefits and results of its spaee aetivities.":15 This sort of
loose interpretation could allow for appropriation of celestial bodies at the
exclusion of others.
The majority of scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty and the antiappropriation clause apply to both public and private entities.:1I' First, the Outer
Space Treaty ensures "free access to all areas of celestial bodies."37
Appropriation activities by corporations or individuals, in addition to those by
states, would violate the treaty because appropriation would naturally exclude
others from enjoying free access to all areas of the celestial body.3x FurthenTIore,
ample evidence reveals that the drafters intended to include private persons and

~

corporations when, in Article 2, they forbade appropriation "by any other
means".19 This catch-all phrase is widely inteq1reted to mean that states cannot
usc other entities to exploit extraterrestrial bodies simply because juridical and
natural persons may constitute a viable "means" of the state ..JO

B. The Moon Treat)'
Thirteen years after the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, the international community drafted the Moon Treaty in an attempt to further specify the
role that states should play in the exploration and use of celestial bodies. The
proposed Moon Treaty, based on many of the same principles as the Outer Space

35 Husby. slipra notc 19. at 364 (quoting Nandasuri Jascntuliyana . . Ir[ie/" I of [he (Jill('/" Space
J. SPAll: L. 129. 139 (19X9)).

Treal)' Re)'i.liled. 17

36 See,
.~ ('rili('({1

e.g .• Zullo, SlIllI'a notc 19, at 2420; Heidi Keefe, Note, Alakillg Ihe Filla/ Frolllier Fcavih/e:

Look al the Currell[ 8m'" of Oll[er -"j",ee

Lall'.

II

s.\" 1 \

('I ,\1<.\ C"~dl'l, II I<

&

HI(dl 1'11'11.

L..I. 345.

35X59 (1995).
37 Outer Space Treaty, slIl,m note 17, art. I.
3g Zullo, slIpra flote 19, at 2420.
39 Kecfe, .I'llI'm note 36, at 359.
40/d. COlltm Stephcn (jorovc. IlItelj,re/illg .Ir/ide /I of the Oilier .\j",('e n'eall', 37

RI.y. 349, 351 (1969).
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Treaty, did not enjoy the same overwhelming support..) I The Treaty has been open
for ratification since December 18, 1979, yet only ten countries to date have
ratified it (not including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom,
or Japan) ..)" The Moon Treaty, in many ways, puts into action the ideals of the
Outer Space Treaty. It declares that the Moon and its resources arc the "common
heritage of mankind"41 and establishes a regulatory regime to ensure that states
obey this provision. 4 -1 Many commentators have interpreted the Moon Treaty as
a moratorium on space exploration until the regulatory regime's instatement. 45
The Moon Treaty prohibits national appropriation in the same manner as
the Outer Space Treaty:
The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim
of sovereignty, by means of usc or occupation, or by any other
means. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor
any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become
property of any State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person. 46

41 Zullo. supra note 19. at 2423.
42 OFFice FOR OUTLR SIWI' AIIAIRS, UNITEil N.\1I0NS OFFICI- AI VIE'I'IA. A(iR1TMEI'o:T CiOVFRNING
rHo ACTI\HIf,S OF SIMI'S ON IHL MOON ANIl OIHU{ CiI.FSTML BOIlII,S, (/1 http://www.oosa.unvicnnu.org/
SpaceLaw/moon.html (last vi,itcd Apr. 13, 2()05) (,howing that the treaty has hccn ratilicd hy Morocco.
Pakistan, Nctherlands, Mexico, Uruguay, Philippincs, Kazakhstan, Chile, Australia, and Austria. The signatories
to the treaty arc: India, Peru, Romania, Francc, and Guatemala).
43 Moon Treaty. slIlira note I X, art. I I. For an cxccllcnt discussion of "Pr()\ incc of All Mankind"
sec David Tan, linl'lIrds (/ N"I\' Regilile liJl'liI" I'rolrclioll o/Oul"r Sj)(lC(! liS liIe 'Pml'illce 01 AI! M(/Ilkilld. "25
YAI F J. l'Il'L L. 145, 159 165 (2000).

44 SI!I! id. paras. 4 5. Thc Moon Trcaty provides:
4. States Partics have the right to exploration and use of the moon without discrimination
of any kind, on thc hasis of equality and in accordance with intcrnational law and the
terms of this Agrccmcnt.
5. Statcs Parties to this Agrecment hcrehy undertakc to estahlish an internatiOlwl regimc,
including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of
the moon as ~lIch exploitation i~ about to become feasible. This provision shall be

implemcnted in accordancc with article I X of this Agrcemcnt.

45 S"" Lynn M. Fountain, Notc, Creillillg MO/ll,,"I{1I1 i11 Space: /,'{ulillg Ill<' I'ora/t'sis Pmdllccd hI'
liIe "CO/ll/l1011 flcriloge o(Mullki11d" !Joelrilll!, 35 CONN. L. RI\·. 1753, 1764 (2003).
46 Moon Treaty. slIlira notc I X, art. II.
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The wording is strikingly similar to the Outer Space Treaty:
The exploration and use of the moon shall be the provincc of all
mankind and shall be can'ied out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic
or scientific development. 47
Again, regardless of the individual contributions ofa statc to the cstablishmcnt of
spacc exploration or celestial appropriation, undcr thc Moon Treaty a noncontributing state will receive a bcncfit and an intcrcst. The rcasoning for such a nonreciprocal arrangement seems to be a desire to pay "[ d]ue regard ... to the
interests of present and future generations" and the "need to promote higher
standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and
development. . . ."4X
An obvious question persists: Why would the United Statcs and other
nations refuse to ratify or even sign the Moon Treaty when it consisted of similar
principles as the Outer Spaee Treaty, which received worldwide support and
ratification just thirteen years earlier? The answer lies in the shortcomings and
impracticability of the Moon and Outer Space treaties. Spccifically, the answer
lics in the fact that states simply did not agrec with the philosophical principle of

res comlllunis on which they arc based.
C. The Cllrrenl Corpus Juris Spatial is: Shortcomings and

In/practicability
The res communis principle cmbedded

In

the current corpus juris

.spatialis will fail for three reasons. First, it is not the way sovereign states have

historically used newly discovered property. Second, it violates our current

47 Id. art. 4. para. I.
4X !d.
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notions of property jurisprudence and it goes against our current capitalist
methods of conducting international relations in a free-market global economy.
Third, human beings may never be able to live by this idealistic principle in the
future; there is little to suggest that it is in our human nature to do so.
Although humankind lived in communal societies in the past, communal
living no longer plays a broad role in today's global society. Examples of
successful communal living for substantial periods of time have generally been
limited to small aboriginal groupS.49 Recent attempts at communal living in the
United States have likewise been small in scale, but also short-lived. 511 Twentieth
century attempts to apply communal living principles on a national scale, such as
those in China or the Soviet Union, likewise have failed. 51
Though the res cOl1llllunis principle enjoyed a certain amount of
popularity in the 1950s and I 960s, the res cOll1l11unis principle had limited, ifany,

49 AL,V" P\(;F FISKI. Sll{llClllRFS 01 SOCI,VL Llffc: Till FOLR EU,~H':-iIARY FORMS OF HI'\'IA>;
RFLAIiONSIIII'S 323 (1991).
50 For example. in the mid I XOOs. Thc Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints sought to
cstablish thc idcal Christian utopia and achicvc economic sc1f-sutllcicncy. Bccausc ofperseculion. poverty. and
disparate wealth among its members. the Church instituted the United Order in the mid-west of the United
States. All personal and real property was conveyed to the Church. which. in turn. conveyed a "stewardship" to
the conveyor. Church members also conveyed surpluscs hom their labor to the Church. The surpluses wcre
then distributed as stewardships to the mcmbcrs of the Church based on their various needs. and to a certain
extent. wants. The systcm soon tailed duc to perceived incquality and greed whcn distribution occurred. S('('
g('/ll!ralil' LFONARIl.l. ARRIN(;tO>;. (jRI'VI BASIN KIN(d)()\I: AN EcONOMIC Hlsr<JRY 01 TIll' LATTFR-DAY SAINfS.
I R30-1900 ( 195R) Ihcreinafter GReAt BASIN KIN(i[)O~ll; Ll,ONARll .I. ARRIN(iTON. ET AL .• BllLDINCi THE CiTY or
GOD: COMMUNI fY ANil COOPER,\TlON AVION(i THF MOR\IONS ( 1976).
More recently. another example of the hlilure of rcv COllllllllllis ideology in application is found in
the utopian societies prevalent during thc 1960s and 1970s. S(,I! Hl'(ill GARDI'R, THe CfIllIlRFN OF PROSI'I,RIIY:
THIRIITN MOIlFRN A~lFRICA'i C(}\lMlINI.S 246 (197X). One of the most common factors for thc failure ofthcsc
systems resulted hom ineffectivc propcrty distribution to contributors and non-contributors alike. TIMOTIIY
MILLLR. THE 6(h COMMIINI.S: HlpplLS ,VNIl BI'YONIl225 (1999). Many communcs that survived were forced to
switch from common owner,hip to a trust systcm which inhercd individual property rights in order to maintain
social viability. Id. at nx. It also appears that communes hequently changed hom common ownership to
private ownership when the c011lmune's land value increased. 5,'('(' PIWP1RIY RIC;Hrs: COOPI'RAIION. CONFLlCr
AND LXII 123 ( Terry L. Andcrson & Fred S. McChesncy cds .• 20(3) I hereinafter PROPFRlY RIGII rs I.
51 Although not a truc res ClJIIIII/I//lis society. pcrhaps one of the most well-known examples of the
failure of rcv COII//IIIII/is ideology would be thc Sovict Union. Se(' BAII~IAN AZ,Vil. HFROIC S rRII(i(iU,. BITTER
[)UHI: LVCIORS C()NIRIIl111IN(; 10 1111· DIS\lNHIIN<; m 1111· SOCIALIsr SI.\II' 11\ IHI USSR (20()0).
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conflicts with today's vibrant, free-market, global economy.52 The gap between
res COII1111Ullis

and the current economic mores is best evidenced by the lack of

support for treaties like the Moon Treaty.
Nations that refuse to support the Moon Treaty have indicated that
acceptance of such treaties would be neither equitable nor practical. Treaties
based on res commltnis principles, such as the Moon Treaty, defy equitable
principles of distribution because non-contributors arc entitled to the exertion of
contributors. As the developed nations have progressed in space technology
development, the exorbitant nature of space exploration costs have become
increasingly apparent.5 3 In conjunction, developed nations are increasingly
reluctant to give the benctits of their expenditures and efforts to developing
nations without reciprocation or consideration. The United States refused to sign
or ratify the Moon Treaty and explicitly expressed its hope that its refusal to
participate in the treaty would '''head otT [the] Third World drive to frustrate
America's hard-won technological supremacy and to undercut private
enterprise's ability to develop space resources. "'5-1

52 Fountain. slIl,m note 45, at 1759.
53 A recent report by the United Staks President';, Commission on Moon, Mars, and Beyond
indicated that NASA should change its structure to encourage the private sector in outer space appropriation
and that NASA should only involve itself where the government is solely qualitlcd. Sce RFPORT OF TIlE
PRES{{)Et-<T'S COMMISSIOt-< ON Itvipi EME'HA Tl001 OF UNI TI'D S IATFS SPAlE I'Xp{(lRAfION POLllY, A JOURr\EY ro
INSPIH, I'INOVATI., AND DIS(,(lVI-R (June 20(4), amilahfe al http://www.nasa.gov/pdt!60736main M2M report
small.pdf (last visited Apr. 13,20(5) I hercinaticr CmIMISSI()'! Rlp(lRll: Michael Coren. While //oll.l'e Re('ei"es
5j}(fc(' Visioll Reporl: 1''''11.'/ San Prim!e Seclor Will Be C(,lI/nd 10 5j}(f('e /:\/,/omlioll. CNN .cO~1 June 16,2004,
http://wwlV.cnn.com/2004:TECHispace!06/ 16/ moon.mars.commi"ion.tinaliindex.html (last visited Apr. 13,
20(5).
54 Frakes . .I'llI'm note 19, at 425 (quoting S.D. Mau, /:'ljllill·. Ihe Third J",rld alit! Ihe Mooll heal\',
g SUFFOLK TRA'ISNAJ'1. L. RlV. 221, 2Sg (19~4)).
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Developed nations arc justified in refusing to participate in inequitable

treaties regarding the exploration of outer space and the use of its resources.
Although developing states may contribute to celestial appropriation by offering
decreased manufacturing and labor costs, these contributions arc not significant
enough to entitle a state to appropriated materials, or their pecuniary equivalent,
resulting from business appropriation activities. The developing states receive
their benefits for providing reduced costs when they get paid for their services.
Giving developing states a second benefit in thc form of shared ownership of
celestial bodies or resources discovercd by developed states is contrary to
established principles of equity in capitalism)"
Even though capitalistic distribution may seem unfair to the lesser party
because the entity in the superior position gains the utmost benefit, it will be the
best principle by which to jump start space exploration and appropriation; res
COI11I7lWlis,

on the other hand, will actually bar its enterprises. Under capitalistic

principles, each party may benefit difTcrently, but parties receive benefits and
incentives that push them to develop and produceY' This incentive is destroyed
when all products arc distributed equally, i.e. to the common heritage of mankind.
A community ownership theory creates an entitlement for persons who do not
labor or invest, thus destroying their incentive to produce. Likewise, the producer

55 Under the Comlllon Heritage Principle. the benetit of outer space exploration and resource
developlllent attaches twice to developing states. It first attaches upon payment fiJr indirect contribution by
providing decreased costs in labor and manufacturing. It again attaches upon redistribution of appropriated
materials hom the common heritage of mankind. If the Outer Space Treaty docs apply to appropriation
activities. a developing state would be entitled to later-in-time benetits even though its contribution toward them
was only indirect. See PROPI Rlv RltilIIS. SIII'rt/ note 50. at 122 23.
A~tl'RI("AN

S(, See gellcrt/lll" Mil TO'J I'RII IlM.\'J'J. ('APII~I IS~I A~!l FRHIlO\1 t 19(2): .Ioll'J KICJNeTl1 GAl IlR.\1 ell.
CAPIIALlSM: TilE CO'JUPI 01 COII'JII'RVI\lt IMi POII!'R (1956).
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who docs not realize the full benefits of his labor also has a disincentive to
produce.
As a practical matter, corporate incentives, rather than govemmental
mandates, guide society today. 57 Although govemments provide an environment
wherein business may thrive or die, societal mechanisms have their basis in
business. Businesses seek lucrative ventures; ifhumankind wishes to appropriate
space, space appropriation must also be lucrative.
The current corpllS jllris ,IJ)(tlialis based on res cOllllllunis has received
wide criticism by legal commentators, in part because of the practical limitations
of its idealistic principles in application. sx For example, one commentator
addressing the potential problems of future colonization of celestial bodies
argued that the prohibition against private and national appropriation may cause
deleterious effects when colonizers build settlementsY! Although these
colonizers may occupy the property, they will have no legal control of their
communities and could be uprooted for the purposes of putting that property to a
better usc for the benefit of common heritage.(llJ This risk may serve as a strong
disincentive to the preservation of sectarian colonization in a res commllnis
society.
Other commentators argue that the current corpus/llris spatialis based on
the idealistic res COll1l11lillis principle has actually slowed the development of

57 See gel/era//)" FR[ID~IAr-; • .I'llI'm note 56;
UTI[

(jAI BRAI III.

slIpra note 5f>;

IIA[{I'\NI'~I. LI8[RIY, AND RU'RFSI'NJArlVr, G()\ERN~JF\Jlill)4X),

58 Sce Keefe, slIpra note 36. at 366 67; Zullo, slIpra note 19, at 2438,
59 Keefe, supra note 36 at 366,
60M

206

JOliN

S 11iART MiLl,

Issue 1

Privatizatiol1 o.j'Space Ventures

outer space exploration because privately and publicly funded organizations
cannot appropriate outer space. 61 Under the current corplIsjllris spatialis, there
exists no probability or possibility of return on investments,l,2 which results in
insufficient monetary incentive for businesses or private persons. Even with the
daunting needs created by increasing population and consumption, and
decreasing resources on earth, many states may not even attempt to exploit
extraterrestrial resources because the current corpus juris spatialis does not
guarantee that their own citizens will benefit from the investments made with
their tax dollars. A future lack of resources, combined with a body of law that
mandates common ownership of potential resources, may create a black market
for extraterrestrial resources, or it may engender armed conflicts over the lack of
supplies available to states. 63
While there is little past precedent to justify it, and little present
sentiment to support it, the current cOI]7l1sjllris spatia/is clings to the idea that in
the future, humans will be able to share the resources of space in common. One
commentator illustrates these idealistic ideas and assumptions:
The articles of the various [outer space J treaties all predicate
thcmselves upon the theory that mankind will work together for
the common good with no real advantage to be gained other than
the praise of his fellow man. It assumes that people are able to
co-operate, and that they will indeed do so whenever dealing
with outer space ventures. While the global effort in researching,
developing and exploring space for the sheer joy of the

61 Fountain.

s/I/}m

note 45. at 1756 57.

62 See it!.
63 For exampk one reason Japan attacked the United States in 1941 was that Japan lacked metal
and oil. and the United States refused to supply the Japanese with these commodities. See gellemlll' 2 TilE NEIl'
E~CY(!()PF[)IA BRIIA"'JI( A I (j()() (15th ed, 2()()3).
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information obtained, accomplished in the spirit of teamwork is
a noble goal, it is clear that a world full of economic strife is ripe
to intervene. 64
These assumptions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty are
unrealistic at present. Perhaps someday humankind will develop ideal characteristics that the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty would like it to engender. In
the meantime, it may be impractical to attempt to solvc the dilemma of space
appropriation based on characteristics yet to be consistently demonstrated.
Furthermore, res communis principles would become problematic as
applied to space law due to the following problcms: (1) thc application of res
communis theory in the Western world has been unsucccssful; and (2) scarcity of

resources in a res coml11unis socicty is fatalistic to the society. It could be argued
that the success of res coml11unis ideology, albeit on a small scale, indicates that
humankind should be able to implement the res cOIll/nwlis ideology.into corpus
juris ,Ipatia/is. While res communis ideology has seen some success in other

societies, it is not prudent to assume that it will enjoy the same successful
application in our increasingly capitalistic, modern society. Societies that have
successfully implemented res cOll1l11unis ideology have had entirely different
goals and values systems than those of the capitalist societies that are now
developing the means for further space exploration. 65 While the isolated

64 Keefe, supra note 36, at 347.
65 Examples of suecessti.1i utopian living for substantial periods of tillle are generally limited to
small, aboriginal groups which value cOllllllunal sharing over authority ranking. F1SKL, SIII""" note ..j'J, at 323.
The values of Western. capitalistic nations that have driven the III to develop the ability to explore space are not
neee"arily present in groups that successfully live cOllll1lunally. If capitalistic nations were to adopt a res
COl/lil/llllis ideology, they might do so at the peril of the very values that would drive the III to continue the
technological adYallcclllcnls that lead to further exploration.
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successes of communal societies in Africa and the Australian Outback are indeed
admirable, they are certainly not the pioneers of space exploration and appropriation. Furthermore, it is difficult to posit that capitalistic nations can successfully
switch to a res communis ideology. Groups that originated in capitalistic societies
and subsequently switched to communal living have ultimately failed and
reverted back to the individual ownership system from which they came. 66
The second problem with using res cOl/IlIll/llis as a basis for property
endowment in outer space law!>7 is the damaging effect of individual appropriation on the community when scarcity ariscs.(,K Even in a res

CO 111 111 1til is

society

where the community owns all property, individual members of the community
nonetheless usc certain parts of that property to the exclusion of the rest of the
community.!''! Such individual use and appropriation against the community is
seen as permissible under a

res C0l111111lllis

ideology supported by Lockean

notions of property endowment; an individual may exclude the community from
property if he or she mixes his or her labor with that propertyJo This individual

6() See 1\1 iller.

SJlpra

note 50: PR()I'I R I Y R]( il! r "'. SlI/Jr({ note 50: (JRI'r\ I B \SIi\ KIN(i])()\l, S{{jlra note

50.

67 Locke's theory of property endowl11ent has been widely used by advocates and proponents of res
Husby. SllfJ/'{/ note 19. at .169 ("The view of the opponents of the Moon Treaty lind an
expression of the principle of res cOl11l11unis in the writings of Locke and Rousscau."). Proponcnts citc Locke's
idea that property is "C01111110n to ali l11en." John Locke. The Secolld Trl!alise 01 COI'cn/lIl!.'III. ill POUIKAI
WRIIII\GS OF JOHN LOCKf 2R3 (David Woolton cd .. 1(93) [hereinafter POI.ITlCA[ WRIII'I(iS [.

C(}llIllIlIIlis theory.

68 SI!I!, cg.. Richard A. Epstein. Possessioll as Ihe Rool 01 Till£!. 13 (,A. L. Rcv. 1221, 1227 ( 1(79).
69 See John Locke, Ti,e Secolld Trcalise oj COI'emlllelll. ill Two TIU·.AllsFs 01 G()\'l.RI\MFI\T 306
(Peter Laslctt cd .• 19(0) ("Whatsoever then he rel110ves out of the State that Nature hath pro\'ided, and Icft it
in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own. and thereby makes it his
Property."); see also POIlII( 'AI WRIII'J(iS, Slil'/'{/ note 67 ( "Iabour ... gave a right of property wherever anyone
wa;, pica'icd to employ it upon what was eoml11on .... ").
70 Locke. Illr example, believed that ali property \vas owned in eOl11mon, but that an individual's
labor gave him a right to property. Husby. SllfJ/'{/ note 19 at 369 (citing (JUlR(ir S. ROBII\SO:-.J & HAROI.D M.
WIIITr., ""VOl'S 01 M.\ '-'1<11\1) I X(, ( 19X6)).
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appropriation does not have a damaging impact on the community as long as
there IS "'enough and as good left in common for others. '''71 However, when
there IS scarcity, the rights of the community against the individual become
increasingly hostile.
In outer space, scarcity will always be an Issue and thus will limit the
utility of res comlllunis based on Lockean principles of property endowment.72
The universe potentially may contain billions of solar systems and planets, but
some celestial bodies may prove to be gold mines, while others prove to be "the
Sahara."73 More important than the scarcity of limited resources, however, is the
scarcity created by human lifespan and technological limitations. The time that
space travel presently takes in comparison to the average human life span limits
our ability to exploit celestial resources. Furthermore, technological limitations
already have created issues of scarcity: such as the increasing problems of
sate II ite positioning and traffic in geostationary orbit. N

71 !d. at I22H (quoting JOII:-i Locn, BOOK II ~ 27 (3d cd. 196(,)); Richard A. Epstein, Th" ,'v/odel"ll
U'I!S ojAlleiml rill\" 4S S.c. L. Rev. 243, 250 (1997).

72 Id. at 12lS; see Joseph S. Spoerl, Thl! Social Respollsihililr ojBl/silli'ss, 4~ AM. J. JIIRIS. 277, nl
(1997) (opining that '"given certain key ti:atures of the hU111an condition. such as li111ikd altruis111 and scarcity
of rC~Ollrccs, it \VOlild be virtually itnpossibk to achieve widespread material prosperity for large numbers of
people without pri,ate property and frec 111arkets"); Anupa111 (,hander & Madhavi Sunder. The HOl/lill/e" ojllll!
[,,,hlic DOI/Illil/. 92 C'Vi, L. Rev. 1331, 1344 (2004) ('"Locke's labor theory of property depends upon the
existence of a C0111111011S or public d0111ain of resources thllll which indiv iduals can !fecly take and
appropriate,").
73 S rll'HlN HAWKIMi, A BRIEF HIS lORY OF TIMI:; FROM Ilil BI(i B'\N(i 10 BiACK HOLES 37 (1988);
Paul Horowitz et aI., Thl! LillI' ,,(Prill/I! NIIII/hen, 6X N.Y.U, L Rev. 1X5. I X9 (1993).
74 Developing states, lacking the technological capahilities to produce satellites, arc concerned that
their interests in space will be superseded by developed states. See, e.g" Francis Lyall, Posls alld
Teh'colI/lI/l/Ilicaliol1s, in 2 UNITTJ) NAII()~S LUiAI OIWloR, 7X9, 796 xn (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C.
./oyner cds. 1995); Milton L. Smith. The 5j}([ce Hill' COllcl"des, H3 A~L J. I" 1'1. L. 596 ( 19X'l), These concerns
were partially addressed when each slale was allocated at least one geostationary orbi!. See M.\RK \V, J~~IS &
./011" E. NOHS, l!';nRN~no'<AL LAW: CASeS A1\1l COMMI'NIARY 637 (2d cd. 20(1). For an excellent reviewal'
scarcity in outer space and satellites, sec Copiz, sllpra note 16, at 216 223.

210

Privatization oj'Space Ventures

Issue I

Property rights in outer space may become hotly contested if it is shown
that there are enormous advantages, realizable profits, and limited resources.
Thus, scarcity is an omnipresent threat and bar to the practical application of res

commllllis ideology to space law. 7 )
Res communis presupposes that property is vested in the human
community ah initio.

Perhaps this idea resonates from the biblical Genesis,

wherein God, on the sixth day, made humankind the beneficiary and governor of
the earth.H' Thus, a res COl111llllilis philosophy applied to the corplisjuris ,Ipatialis
would likely assume that all property in the entire universe belongs to the
common heritage of humans.
This assumption is dangerously close to the assumptions made by
Westerners seeking to discover the Americas.

They deemed Amerindians

75 Outer
The Space Treaty and Moon Treaty will not solve Locke's philosophical problem by
redistributing the proceeds of the appropriated r"s /(lr thc bcncfit of humankind, bccause not cvery person will
bcnefit from thc common heritage fillld. Additionally, thc themc of this criticism is against Locke's idca of
property rights in a capitalist socicty which adhcrcs to strong thcmcs of privatization and individualislll.
Thcrct,",c, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Trcaty, although consistent with the principle of r('s CO/llllllUlis
in it:-. distribution in some aspccls, <Irc incollsi~kl1t with the capitali~tic nature of ~ocicty today.

76 Gel/esis 1:26 30 (King .lames). It reads:
26. And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our
likcness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea. and
over the l(lWI of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth,
and over every creering thing that ereereth upon the earth.
27. So God created man in his own image, in thc image of God
created he him; male and female created he them.
28. And God blessed thelll, and God said unto thelll, Be fj-uitli.i1,
and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have
dominion over thc fish of the sea, and over thc fowl of the air, and
over every li\·ing thing that 1l10vcth upon thc earth.
29. And Ciod said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing
seed. which is upon the hIee of all the earth, and every tree, in the
which is the li-uit of a tree yielding secd; to you it shall bc I(lr mcat.
30. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air,
and to every thing that ereepeth upon the earth, wherein there is
life. I have given every green herb Illr meat: and it was so.

211

INTERNATIONAL LAW

&

MANAGEMENT REVIEW

Spring 2005

inhabiting the land they "discovered" as incapable of holding fee because they
wcre not "civilized" undcr Western standards.7 7
If corpusjllris spatia/is incorporates the philosophy of lerra Ilullius, on

the other hand, title contlicts could be avoided. Terra lIullius promotes the idea
that land belongs to no one, until someone has mixed his or her labor with it.7 x
Thus, titlc acquisition for extraterrestrial regions would be determined by who is
first to mix labor into the land, regardless of state or origin.79

III.

ABANDONING TilE OUTER SPACE TREAfY

The Outer Space Treaty should be abandoned. Some signatory states may
attempt to impose the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty on all states under
the argument that it has become customary international law. The Outer Space
Treaty's obligations, however, may be avoided in two ways. First, the Outer
Space treaty could be nullified by demonstrating a fundamental change of
circumstances that has arisen since the treaty's signing. Sccond, unilateral
appropriation against the Outer Space Treaty's provIsIons may encourage
widespread abandonment or consent to abandonment.

77 SI!I! Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (IX23) (explaining that ··the uniform understanding and
practice of European nation", and the settled law, as laid down by the tribunals of civilized states, denied the
right of the Indians to be considered as independent comlllunities, having a permanent property in the soil,

capable ofalicnatioll to private individuals. They remain in a

~la1c

of nature, and have never been adtnittcd into

the general society of nations"). For general information of the treatment of Amerindians, see, RICIIARIl
DRIM\ON, F~CI'I{i \\'I-SI: Till MLTAI'IIYSI{S Of 1!,;IJIAN-HAIIN{i ANIJ E\'II'IH-BlilllJl'I(i (1997): Roy H~R\'EY
PEAR{E, SA\A{iISVI A1\f) ('IVILI/AIION: A SillilY 01 1m, INIlIA1\ A'I1l IIiL AVII,RI(AN MIND (199X): DAVID E,
S J ·\NI\ARD, A\1LRI( '/\1'\ HOI O( 'A US r: C()LlJl\1Bll~ \N]) 1111', C()NC)t'l:S I 0]' IIII'. Nt,\\, WORL]) (1992)~ Rl ,SSFl L
TIIOR" ION, A~lIcRI',\N 11\I)IA", 1101 OCAI" ANIl SI.R\WAI.: A P()I'LI AII()" HIs nlRY Sl~( I 1492 ( 1(90),
7R SeC' gel/era III , P()I III'AI WRIIIN(iS, slIlml note (, 7,
79 SI!C gCl/eralll' iii.
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A. Fundamental Change in Circumstances
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) recognizes that
states should not be bound by a treaty when there has been a fundamental change
in circumstances. xo Aliicle 62 of the Vienna Convention explains the appropriate
circumstances for states to terminate or withdraw from a treaty:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occuned with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty
unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform
the extent of the obligations still to be perfonTIed under the
treaty.
States commonly regard this principle contained

111

the Vienna Convention as

customary international law.xl
This provision of the Vienna Convention has been tested in the
International Court of Justice ("IC],,). In The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-

Nagymaros Project, the court acknowledged that a state could be released from
its treaty obligations where there was a fundamental change in circumstances. x2
However, it held that a state could not be released from its treaty obligations
where the changes, fundamental or not, were foreseeable or where the purported
change did not closely link to the purpose of the treaty. Xl Further, the court also

RO Vicnna ("ol1\ention on the Law of Treatics. ()/wIled fiJI' sigll"{,,re May 23. 1969. art. 31. 1195
U.N.TS. 331. X I.L.M. 679 Ihereinatier Vienna Convention I.

XI See Gahcikovo-NagYll1aros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.). 19971.('.1.3 (Feh. 5). a\'(ii/ah/e ,,{ 1997
WL 289957: see ,,/so 37 I.L.M. 162 ( 1998) (citing Fisheries ./urisdiction. 1.('..1. Reports 1973. at 63. para. 36).
82 Ciabcikovo-NagY111aros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.). 1997 1.e..J. 3.

83 !d.

213

INTERNATIONAL LAW

&

MANACiEMENT REVIEW

Spring 2005

concluded that a purportcd change must closely link to the purpose of the treaty;
otherwise there could be no release from the treaty obligations. x4

In Gabcikovo-NagYl1laros Project, Hungary sought to be released from
its treaty obligation with Czechoslovakia. X) In 1977, the parties entered into the
treaty to build a dam together and planned to benefit mutually from its
construction. x6 In 1998, Hungary suspended its work on the dam citing environmental concerns, and it unilaterally purported to terminate the treaty.X7 Hungary
argued that circumstances had fundamentally changed sincc 1977, citing the
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the diminishing economic viability or the project,
and the increased progress of environmental awareness and environmental
treaties. xx The court held that the existing environmental knowledge in 1977 was
sutIicient for the parties to have foreseen environmental dcvclopmcnts. x4 The
court also asserted that one of the purported changes, the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia, was not closely linked to the purpose of the treaty, which was
dam building. 911 Notably, the Vienna Convention did not explicitly bind Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, yet the court held that article 62 codified customary international law which in turn bound the paliics.'JI

~4 Id.

H5 Id
X6 Id

X7 Iii. para.

n.

88 Id. para. 104.
89 Jd.
90 Jd.
91 Iii. paras. 99. 104.
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Although foreseeability precluded Hungary from abandoning its treaty
obligation in The Case Concerning the Cahcikovo-NagYl11aros Project, foreseeability would likely not preclude the parties to the Outer Space Treaty from doing
so. Unlike Hungary, the parties to the Outer Space Treaty could not have foreseen
the extent of the obligations and the nature of said consent. At the time of the
treaty's signing, only governments conducted space activities; the privatization of
outer space programs was virtually non-existent. Unlike Hungary's argument that
the new circumstances rendered the project economically infeasible, commercial
profit from space exploration did not exist during the ratification of the Outer
Space Treaty and, therefore, remained outside the minds of the signatories.
NASA, for example, was only nine years old when the Outer Space Treaty was
formally presented in 1967. 92 The United States government, as well as other
nations with space programs, could not have understood or foreseen the impact
of privatization and the decreased role states would occupy in outer space
exploration and appropriation in the following decades.
Indeed, what was on the minds of the contracting parties at the time they
signed the Outer Space Treaty was winning the space race.'!J During the drafting
of the Outer Space Treaty, the United States and the U.S.S.R. competed to
demonstrate their technological and military superiority.94 Owing to this power
struggle, the U.S.S.R. and the United States preferred to hurriedly acquiesce to

92 See generally N;\S;\ History Division. http:;/history.nasa.gov! (noting that N;\S;\ was created in
195X). The Ollter Space Treaty was open f()r signature in 1967. SCi! Outer Space Treaty, Slipi'll note 17.
93 See Ty S. Twibell, Note, ,Sj}({ce
otOlller S/,iI(,l!. 65 UMKC
94 SCI! gi!lll!ralir

Lilli"

Legill Rl!slraillls

Oil

COIIIIIII!I'ciillbllioll illld DI!1·elojJIIII!III

L. Rf\,. 5R9, 599 (1997).
Risley.

SII/,I'<I

note 15.
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the Outer Space Treaty rather than gamble on their own state's ability to reign
supreme over outer space. 9 ) Their ultimate goal, however, was domination of
outer space appropriation through technological innovation; neither nation had
any concern for the profitability of the venture.
Certainly, the political conditions surrounding space appropriation have
undergone a dramatic and fundamental change since the Outer Space Treaty was
signed at the height of the Cold War. In nlct, that Cold War mentality-win the
space race-is antithetical to the current nature of space appropriation. Now, in
addition to national space agendas, the space race consists of private companies
competing for prizes, such as the Ansari X Prize, and contracts from cell phone
and tourism companies.
The Moon Treaty illustrates the fundamental change in circumstances
that has occurred since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. The Moon Treaty
borrowed and embellished the Outer Space Treaty's proviso from "province of all
mankind" to "common heritage," but added spccificity.96 It failed to obtain
sufficient signatures from developed states and the vast majority of developing
states, including those who had signed the Outer Space Treaty just twelve years
before. 97
The fundamental change that occurred after the signing of the Outer
Space Treaty was rapid technological advancement. Many signatories to the

95 Si:i! iii; Fountain. SII/JnI note 45, at 1753 n,4 (citing Ezra.l. Rein,tein. Oll'llitlg OllieI' Sj}({ct', 20
Nil. .I. '''T'L L. & BIIS. 59, 62 (1999)).

96 Outer Space Treaty. slIllra note 17. art I: Moon Treaty. slIl"'a note I X. art. II,
97 SCi: Oftice for Outer Space Athir,.
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Outer Space Treaty had once doubted the cmerging possibilities of extraterrestrial
colonization, lunar mineral appropriation, and militaristic outer space activitics. 9x
However, during the time between the signing of the Outer Space Treaty and the
"rejection" of the Moon Treaty, the United States landed on the lunar surface,
developed more complex satellites, and contracted many of NASA's projects to
private industry. In the face of these rapid technological advances, it could no
longer commit to the Moon Treaty, even though it could have been seen as more
of the same kind of promises made in the Outer Space Treaty.
Another fundamental change in circumstances since the signing of the
Outer Space Treaty is the shift of outer space appropriation and exploration from
states to global corporations. 99 Global corporations arc quickly becoming the new
super power in outer space appropriation and exploration. Pecuniary incentives
based on profitability and concerns of diminishing resources are likely to fuel
technological advances in the space industry.loo These fundamental changes
present new challenges to outer space appropriation which were non-existent
when the Outer Space Treaty became effective.

B. Unilateral Appl'Opriation againsl the OIL tel' Space Treaty
In addition to a changc in fundamcntal circumstances, other mechanisms

may induce the abandonment of the Outer Space Treaty. As previously discussed,
the first mechanism for abandonment would simply involve developed and

98 Twihcll. SIII)},lI note 93. at 59X.
99 SCI.' COMMISSI()'1 RIP()RT. slIli/,{/

100

SCI!, e.g.,

note 53.; Coren, SIIP/'{/ note 53.

Britt, SIII'/'{/ note 3; I'ilgill GlIllIc/ie, SIII'/'{/ notc 5; Malik. SIIP/'{/ notc 6.
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developing states mutually consenting to terminate the Outcr Space Treaty. 101 As
an alternative to mutual consent, these states may also abandon the treaty in
practice by simply appropriating cxtraterrestrial lands uni laterally, based on their
reservations and interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty. If dctermined to be
customary international law, the Outer Space Treaty may not permit these
actions, but unilateral action may jumpstali extraterrestrial appropriation by other
states. If enough states join in the appropriation, adversc adjudication may prove
unlikely.

IV.

PROPOSALS FOR CELESTIAL ApPROPRIATION

CUlTent approaches attempt to reform the existing corpllsj/lris ,\jultialis
by either working within thc confines of a res cOl11l11unis framework or by
creating cntirely new bodies of regulatory authority. These approaches are
insufficient because they do not provide enough compensation or incentive to
private enterprises and states. Despite the laudable and widely discussed attempts
at reform within the existing framework of CHM principles, theorists are unable
to provide effective solutions that compensate for market pressures and human
self interest.
Thus, states should abandon the Outer Spacc Trcaty and Moon Treaty in
favor of a free-market approach based on traditional property jurisprudence
which acknowledges and utilizes the capitalistic nature of modern economies. 102

I~ 1'1..

&

101 See Ty S. Twibcll, Note & ('omment,
L. 259, 292 (1')97).

CirClIIIIII{/I'igOlillg IlIlel'llllliollo/

Sj}(lce LIl)\', 4 ILSA J.

('mIl'.

102 C( Hrandon C. Gruncr, Comment, ANn\' flopi' fiJI' IlIlemaliolla/ Space LOll': Illcorporalillg
A'illetccl1th Ceil/lilY First Possession Principle,l; 111/0 ,//(! IlJo7 S'Pll(,(! n'C{/ly lor the C%l1i:::alioll (~r()lIt(!r SI}(Jcr!
ill Ihe Tm!lIll'-Firsl Cenlllr\,. 35 Seton Hall L. Rcv. ~l)9 (2004) (proposing the implcmcntation of a property

rights-based system that relics on thc doctrinc of tirst posscssion to govcrn cxtratcrrcslrial appropriation and
arguing for the reemergence of nineteenth century first possession

the colonization of outcr spacc).
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This jurisprudence is the most practicable solution because it has guided human
acquisition of property for millennia. Traditional property jurisprudence would
allow all states to actively participate in an outer space market by grant of charter.
Laws basing the acquisition of extraterrestrial property on (I) discovery; (2)
claim; and (3) possession would best facilitate and encourage outer spaee
appropriation and exploration.
A. The Age

()IDis('ovel~\'

([nd the Age oj'Space Exploration

States should abandon the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty in favor
of a free-market approach to space law based on traditional property jurisprudence. A capitalist approach to acquisition in outer space, such as the one
evidenced in the Americas during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, would
accommodate the nature of humankind that has evidenced itself for millennia,
incorporating the components of human nature in an orderly, cquitable manner.
Thc most compelling property right recognized by traditional property jurisprudence, as applied to outer space, is acquisition by discovery. This method of
acquisition contains three distinct phases: (I) discovery; (2) claim; and (3)
possession. Discovery and claim create an inchoate title which is perfected by
possessIOn.
1. Di.s'covelY
The most appropriate analogy to outer space appropriation

IS

the

discovery of the New World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because,
much like Outer Space, the world was open to appropriation. Europeans based
their appropriation of the New World on the doctrine of acquisition by discovery.
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Under this doctrine, the discovery process began when a state granted a charter
to a juridical or natural person. 1m The ehatier allowed the grantee to claim land
in the name of the grantor state and entitled the grantee to certain contractual
benefits and obligations pursuant to the provisions of the eharter. I()4 This analogy
appropriately accommodates for the inevitable changes in cUlTent environmental
and humanitarian concerns, as well as the expected advancement of developing
states. lOS
The Roman maxim: "Qui prior esl tempore pOlioI' esl jure," ("Who is
first in point of time is stronger in right.") established a basic concept in the
doctrine of acquisition by discovery.loc, From this concept developed one of the
1110st basic rules of property law: acquisition by capture and original
possession.I0 7 As a general principle, the first person who discovers a resource is
entitled thereto. lOS In short, no sovereignty may be exerted over property unless
the propeliy is discovered by the sovereign or its agents.
When the Europeans discovered the Americas, countries eagerly laid
claim to and appropriated as much land as they could acquire. 1m A sovereign
entity granted a charter to companies and endowed them with power to act on

I 03

S~('

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 ( I K32).

104 S('(' id.

105 The Age of Discovery was a horrendous time It)r the indigenolls peoples thai inhabited the
Americas, India, and Ali-ica. One of the harshest criticism, 01 the Age of Discovery and the property rules
pertaining thereto is the devastation leveled on native peoples by overzealous discoverers and sovereigns who
considered the

nativc~ non-posscssor~

of the land due to their perceived migratory living. Because the native
lal'll II II Ifill.l . S('(' Johnson v.

peoples were incorrectly considered non-po"cssors, the land was deemed as
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (IX23).
10(, .IlSSI.
107 It!.
10K

SCI'

Dl;[,LVlINIl

&

.LVMI

sF.

KRILl{, PIWl'l RJY -'

Johnson v. M' Intosh. 21 U.S. 543 ( I X23).

109 Id at 572 73.
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bchalf of thc sovcrcign statc to claim tcrritory in cxchangc for taxcs paid on thc

companies' profits. I 10 In order to avoid conflicts with other states, a principle was
establishcd that "discovery gave title to the government by whose ... authority,
it was made, against all other European governments, whieh title might be
consummated by possession. "III States acquired title by vicarious discovcry
when one of their subjects or chartered companies discovered new territories. II 2
This well-established law in propel1y jumpstarted land discovery in the
Americas because vast stretches of land were not owned, especially in Central
Amcrica.1J1 In England, as carly as 1496, thc quccn grantcd a commission to John

Cabot, allowing him to search for unknown countries. 114 Two years thereafter,
Cabot discovered what is now known as the North American continent. 115 The
English traced their title from Cabot's grant to his discovery.1I6 Henry Hudson,
who sailed under the flag of Holland with orders from the East India Company,
discovered lands from the Delaware to the Hudson, whereby Holland claimed by
discovery that new country called "New Netherlands."117 Spain, although granted
title by the Pope, also claimed title in the Americas by rights of discovery.llx

II () s~~ Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (I R32)
III Id.

112 III.
113 The llrl'vai ling thought in the Age of Discovery and during the several hundred years t(,IIowing
insisted that the Amerindians were nol owners of land due to their migratOlY patterns and purported heathen
nature. Although the author disagrees \vith this axiom. the author specifically addresses the perception of the
colonizers and exploiters during the Age of Discovery. See Johnson. 21 U.S. at 572 ·73.

114 See iii.
115/d.
1161d.

117 Id.
II RId.
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Likewise, France claimed Louisiana and parts of Canada based upon acquisition
by discovery.119
The Europeans acquired their rights to discovered propcI1y vis-a-vis the
right of the crown in granting the charter, and the grantee's ability to discover and
possess the land. 120 Thus, in equitable tenns, the discoverer's exertion rewarded
the sovereignty and the discoverer with vested title. Explorers endured great risks
and hardships when they sailed across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to look for
discoverable lands; thus, they were entitled to some benefiLI21 Not only did they
risk large amounts of capital, but they also risked their lives in these voyages
fraught with unfortunate demise and plunderY'2
Outcr space exploration and appropriation should apply this traditional
rule of discovery because it rewards the states and entities who are willing and
able to take the risks and hardships assoeiated with such activities. This construct
appeals to basic ideas of fair dealing. For example, if company A seeks to place
a hotel on Mars, then company A would be required to seek a charter from a state.
When company A discovers the extraterrestrial region upon its arrival, it would
claim the territory in the name of the granting state. The state would then own the
extraterrestrial region in fee; and pursuant to its charter, the state would convey
its interest, in fee or term of years, to company A in full or portion thereof.

119 Iii.

12() !d.
121 See. e.g ..
C!R("lI\I!,;AVI(,,\[!ON O!

193 466 (1997);

222

(20()3);

RONAW H. I'RIIL,

122 See, e.g.,
121.
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Company A would perform its exploitation activities (hostelry) pursuant to the
guidelines of the charter and be subject to the power of the granting state.
States would freely negotiate multilateral or bilateral treaties with other
states concerning established norms for granting charters. A state could
preference a grant of charter upon the use of environmental procedures to limit
the harm done to the celestial body. States may seek to limit the levels of
appropriation, ensure safety procedures, provide dispute resolution with foreign
companies, or define the limits of national appropriation pursuant to treaties with
other states.
The prImary problem with this system is the possibility of charter
shopping. This is not an unrealistic concern given that charter shopping is
common in the world today. For example, many island nations offer banking
services that developed states would otherwise prohibit to persons of the
developed state. Ie' Corporations actively seek states wherein they receive the
greatest benefit for the least

COSLI24

Although private enterprises' state charter shopping has been seen as
legitimate,125 such practices nonetheless catTY problematic effects. In order to
produce income for their state, many developing states allow "open" registers
123 See B. Chad Bungard. Offsilore HallAillg ill Iile Hrilisil Ihpelldel/cies,

<) TOUR()

Irq'l L. RF\·.

141 (20t)!).
124 For example, many corporations outsource to stntes with, inter alia, less stringent
safety procedures or less cOlllpensntion.
125 Shopping for statc charters. howcver. has been acknowlcdged as a legitimate maritime practice
in international arbitration. In Tile Case oflile Mllseal f)ilo\l's, Britain questioned France's practice of allowing
non-French states to usc thc French flag. See Frallce-Hrilaill. 19(}5. ill Till- HV(i1 rF ARRI I R·\rI()~ C.~srs 64
(George G. Wilson cd., 1(15) Ihcrcinafkr Frallce-Brilai,l/. Britain was concerned by those states' suspected
illegal slave trade and bccause a serics of British-French treaties limited Britain's rights to intercede in French
matters. See JA'W, & NO'Ilcs, slIpra note 74, at (,52. In response to the British-French conflict, thc arbitrator
expounded on the common rule:
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that do not require the vessel, its owner, or its erew, to have any connection with
the registering state or even undergo periodic inspections.!26
However, many of these concems about charter shopping could be
placated if a genuine link is required between the granting state and the charter
company. The Intemational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea acknowledged the
legal significance of such a link in Saint Vincent (lnd the Grenadines

I'.

Guinea.127

In that case the vessel Saiga flew the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
and supplied fuel to fishing vessels in Guinea's exelusive economic zone.!2K A
Guinean patrol vessel attacked the Saiga, and brought the vessel and its crew to
Guinea.!29 The presiding tribunal required Guinea to pay compensation to Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines for excessive force. Ll0 Guinea contested paying
compensation by asserting that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines did not have
standing to submit their claims given that the vessel Saiga, and not the state, was
the party harmed.!3!

lGJenerally speaking Jthe right to tly a tlag over a vessel of a ditrerent sovereignty]
belongs to every Sovcrcign to dccide to whol11 he will accord the right to tly his tlag and
to prescribe the rules governing such grants ... therc!tll'c the granting of the French tlag
to subjects of Janother sovereign J in itself constitutes Ja icgitimate exercise.J
Fnlll('(:'-Britulll.

126 I". at 6.19. Even though many corporations currently poised to explore outer space may reside
and be incorporated in developed nations. those corporations could always di"oh'e and incorporate elsewhere
in order to tind a charter in a state with the 10\\ cst fcc:-., in:-'lIfficicnt in:-.pcctioll and enforcement mechanisms.
and a relative lack of procedural rcquisik:-. among other things. Ha\"ing potentially hazardous vessels acti\·cly
cngaged in international COl11mercc without being requircd by their registering statc to takc sutlicient precautions, may ultimatciy lead to an increased number of incidents. such as the Shctlands disaster. Additionally. the
rcgistering statc or thc vessel's company may lack sutlicient resources to correct or mitigate the environmcntal
dall1agc once problems occur. Sec Safer S'llIjJs, ('Iealler Seas, Rcport oj Lord f)ol1uldsol1:\ hU/Hir\' hllo the
Prl!1'elllioll O/POlllllioll Fro II I MO'('//(/1I1 Shil'l'illg, CIll25hO (1994), a\ 1·+7.

127 International Tribunal ttlr the Law of the Sea, 31'1 I.L.M. 1323 (1999).
121'1 Iii..
129 Id.

130M
131 Jd. a\ para. 75.
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Relying on The La\\' of" the Sca COf/l'cntion and the Convention of" the
High Seas, the tribunal insisted that compensation was appropriate because of the

genuine link between the vessel Saiga and the state ofSt. Vincent. 1,2 The tribunal
found that a genuine link existed between the charter company and the granting
state based on a series of factors. These factors include the following: (I) the state
had signed and ratified treaties that rcgulated high sea vessels; (2) the state had
established regular protocols and procedures for the inspection of the company's
vessels; (3) the company had incorporated the vessel in the state; (4) the state had
made vigorous efforts to secure the protcction of thc company's vessel; and (5)
thc statc had given preference to its nationals to allow the flying of its flag.

I"

The factors on which the tribunal in Saint Vincent rested its decision
should dispositively apply to whether a private enterprise may receive a grant
from a state to appropriate extraterrestrial regions and travel into outer space.
Private enterprise would not be as tempted to obtain a charter from any particular
state because it would know that, without a genuine link between itself and the
charter granting state, any activities it performed vicariously for that state would
be invalid. Additionally, a charter-granting state would feel more confident in
offering the private enterprise its protection because it would know that it has
standing in international forums to handle disputes or recover damages
associated with that enterprise. Developing states would be free to contract with
private enterprises competitively as long as a genuine link existed to establish

1.1~ '"There 1l11,,1 nisi a genuine link belween the State and thc ship; in particular. the State must
efkctively exercise its jurisdiction and control in adl!1inistratilonl. technical and social matters over ships flying
its flags." !d.
133 fd. at para. 7S.
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minimum administrative control over the private enterprise's appropriation
activities. These administrative controls would ensure both environmental and
safety standards, but would not be so overbearing as to completely strip away
bargaining power from the developing state. The same process, convention
signing and ratification, would expedite the implementation of the rule presented
in Saint Vincent.
In addition to the foregoing, other actions may be taken to prevent
charter shopping. The United States and other developed states could effectively
encourage and coerce developing states into multilateral and bilateral agreements
that protect the environment and ensure safety procedures. This coercion would
result from threats to levy sanctions on trade or withhold loans, aid, and grants.
Furthermore, states may bar the import of products from a corporation incorporated in a rogue state that docs not meet certain requirements. Although corporations typically choose their localities based on contractual benefits and resultant
cost and profit projections, other factors might persuade corporations to gain a
charter from a developed state including military protection, education of
populace, stability of govemment, tort and contract law protections, power and
int1uenee in the intemational community, established and uniform system of
jurisprudence, industrial infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, availability
of natural resources, sanctions placed against the charter granting state, and
locality. For example, many United States' citizens who seck to experience outer
space as tourists may decline services offered by developing states that do not
have the same characteristic safety mechanisms, tort law, and convenience of a
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developed state. On the other hand, some tourists may seck the least expensive
services despite the increased risks.
The charter system is not perfect. Inevitably, this system will create
injustices to some and undue compensation to others. However, this traditionalist
approach will provide a body of space law that encourages humankind to explore
and appropriate celestial bodies. It will do so because it will operate under the
system upon which the majority of the world already relics today: a market
economy based on traditional property jurisprudence.
The charter system will have the added benefit of propelling dcveloping
states into space exploration as corporations take advantage of their charters.
Developing states will have the opportunity to participate in the appropriation of
outer space by their extension of natural and juridical persons into outer space. In
this manner, developing states wi 11 enjoy increased territories, increased jobs for
their populace, increased availability of appropriated materials, and increased tax
revenues from appropriation activities. Instead of receiving indirect funds under
the common heritage, developing states will become active participants in a
market economy based upon the posturing of their contracts. Developing states
would not be required to invest heavily in aerospace technologies because
juridical persons would bring those technologies to the developing states. This
system would increase competition and jumpstart space appropriation activities
for all countries. Both developing and developed states would actively compete
and appeal to corporations based upon the corporation's objectives and the state's
interests.
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This approach has many bencfits over the corpllsjllris spatia/is and other
alternative theories:
I.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

Companies could pre-negotiate the terms of the charter
with the granting state, creating security for the
Company who would know what sort of revenues it
must raise and sustain to make the enterprise a success.
Companies would be granted a secure interest in the
extraterrestrial region, which would facilitatc
invcstment.
States would widen their boundaries while providing no
capital.
States would realize pecuniary funds derived from
appropriation activities via taxes.
States would have increased resources from the
appropriated materials.
States could ensure environmental protection by
multilateral and bilateral conventions, as well as
contractual posturing in the granting of a charter to a
company.
The system would utilize current systems of government
and would not require creation of new international
legislative bodies.
States would maintain their own sovereign entity and
could not be superseded by an international regime.
Granting of charter would be a fact specific contract that
would allow workable solutions pursuant to the specific
needs of the company and the concerns of the state.
The system would be based on commonly recognized
principles of capitalism and a free market economy.

Admittedly, the di fference between past and present day technology
would create a problem with a discovery approach based on principles of
appropriation from the l500s and 1600s. In the Age of Discovcry, the confines of
sight and mapmaking abilities limited discovery due to crude instrumentality as
compared to today's satellite eapabilities.134 In contrast, our sense of sight can be
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extended far beyond the reaches of this galaxy through the usc of modem
technology. Our current map making instruments far exeeed the crude instruments used by Columbus and Magellan. 1l5 From a literalist approach, humankind
could own millions of light years of outer space just because they "saw" it
through some sort of sophisticated technology. If states applied the appropriation
principles of the Age of Discovery without any modification, they could merely
invest in telescopic technology and capture vast solar systems as their own. This
idea seems repugnant to fair dealing because it would allow a state a right to
appropriate vast solar systems with minimal exertion.
The essential principles of discovery would not be diminished if modifications or limits were made regarding the permissible use of sight-enhancing
technology in the diseovery of outer space. The most crucial aspect of discovery
docs not rely on the ability of the senses at any given point in history; instead, it
relies on the utilization of those senses in a perilous and laborious manner. The
underlying principle of acquisition by discovery rests on the laboriousness of the
effort and peril of the voyage. Finding an object in outer space by use of a
telescope or other sense enhancing mechanism docs not entail significant risk of
life or loss of chattel. Although laborious in many instances, such procedures are
not analogous to Columbus' efforts to sail across the ocean in search of new land
and they should not endow the user with a vested interest in fee.
In the context of extraterrestrial appropriation, in order for an entity to
discover land, current space law should require that the discoverer ambulate and

135 S"" Gtl\s. S,\II S Arm 1;\II'IRFs. ,I'llI'm note 134: BI.R(;RH~. ,I'llI'm note 121: D,wlf)so". ,I'llI'm
note 121. at 193 466: FRII /. ,I'll/,m note 121.
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physically stake a claim upon the extraterrestrial regIOn because ambulation
entails signifieant labor and peril. This sort of space exploration is necessarily
laborious and fraught with risk. Consider scientists who have dedicated
themselves to aerospace engineering, aerospace construction, astronomy, and
other diseiplines to hclp in the design of a space shuttle. Astronauts train many
years before they can maneuver and fly a space craft. The space program is very
expensive and requires a vast amount of resources.

m Death occurs often in the

space industry, as the families of the crew on the Challenger and Columbia can
testify.137 Given its laborious and risky nature, discovery of celestial bodies is
well suited for subjection to the same traditional property jurisprudence used by
discoverers centuries ago.

2. Claim
Discovery of propelty does not by its very nature make it property of the
statc. In order for a state to gain title to land, it must make a claim. Declaration
of title, through the making of a claim, puts everyone in the whole world on
notice that celtain propelty belongs to a certain state.

In France v. United Kingdom, the International Court of Justice (lC])
declared that the making of a claim, along with other appropriation activities,
established a state's sovereignty over land.l3x In this case, the ICJ had to decide
whether groups of islets and rocks between the British island of Jersey and the

136 Sl'l' C()\l~llSSl()N RU'()Rl,

a{

slIl'ra

note 54; Coren,

SlIl)J"1I

note 54.

137 Transcript, () Xl'ell'. ".1 hllgic /Jill' Ii,,' (!u! N,ISA Flllllilr. "CNN.l()~t, Feb. 2, 2003, lI\'(filllhle
http;//www.cnn.comi2003lTI.CH/space/02 ..Olishl1ttle.nasa.transcriptiindex.html(last visited Apr. 13,20(5).
13X Minql1icrs and Ecrchos Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953I.C..I. 47 (Nov. 17).
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coast of Francc wcre subject to the sovereignty of France or England. Ll9 The
court reviewed numerous treaties and grants in those islands spanning the
thirteenth century to the nineteenth century.

I·j()

In this review the court noted that

France, in its notes and charters, had not included particular islands as their
telTitory, whereas the British had. 141 The court found that this official inclusion,
as well as other continual appropriation activities, was a "clear manifestation of
British sovereignty."14c In short, Britain owned the islands because it had claimed
ownership to them and asserted state authority while France had not.
A state must clearly manifest intent to makc a claim for that claim to be

valid. In the Advisory Opinion of the Westel11 Sahara, the IeJ concluded that
Spain had not made a proper claim of sovereignty over Westel11 Sahara because
it had merely expressed agreement to protect the land, rather than claim actual
ownership of it. 14 ' In his Royal Order of 1884, the King of Spain had only
declared that he had taken the Rio de Oro under his protection based upon
agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes. 144 The King never clearly
manifested a claim of ownership.
In order for a state to own a celestial body or extratelTestrial regions, the
state should be required to make a clearly manifest claim. The state should put
the rest of the world on notice that the state believes it owns the property. ffother

139 !d. at .:IX.

140!d. at 50.
141 Id.at47.51.6h.
1.:12 Id. at t\h.
143 Advisory Opinion on thc Westcrn Sahara (Spain v. Morocco), 19751.('..1. 12 (Oct. 16), para. RI.
144 1d.
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states disagree or competing claims arise, then those states could resolve those
conflicts according to their bilateral or multilateral treaties or other available
mechanisms. An implied claim should not sufficiently satisfy the claim
requirement because it docs not clearly put the rest of the world on notice and
would increase the number of competing claims to the same land.

3. Possession: The Ac:t o/Appropriatio/l
"Grabbing," a crude description of land acquisition and possessIOn,
accurately describes the procedure for the final step in original possession.1 45
Under customary international law and traditional property jurisprudence,
discovery and claim establish an inchoate title; possession perfects title thereto. 146
The discovery of a body of land and laying claim thereto arc insufficient actions
for entitlement and ownership of land. 147 The discoverer must take possession
thereof. 14S

145
HISIORym AN

DliKf\Il:-1ll'R,

sllpra note 106, at 4 (quotlllg

RIlII.\IW SCfIl ,\lIIR, PRIVAI L PIW"LRI y:

Tile

Im'A 13031 (1951)).

146 Sec T. O. Elias, The /Joctrille of IlItatelll/JOra/ lAlli', 74 AM. J. IN!'L L. 285, 2XX (1980);
Seokwoo Lee. COlltilluing ReICl'(///ce of Traditiollal '''todes of Territorial //c'lliisitioll ill In/ema/iollal Lall' (111£1
(I Modest Proposal, 16 Cmm. J. INT'I L. 1,3 (2000); Risley, SliP/,£! note 15, at 5-1; Nicolas J. Watkins. C0111111ent,
Displlt£'d Sm·l!r£'igllt,· ill til£' Falklalld Islallds: The .llgell/illa-Great Bri/aill ('Oll/tiel of /1)8], II F! A. S I. U. L.
R[\. 649, 661 62 (1983).
147 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.V. Sup. Ct. 18(5). Applicable by analogy, this tlullOUS case
made clear that a property right in animab can be acquired only by po"ession. In particular, the court noted
that animals tlJllnd in nature belong to no one. Thus, while a hunter may have first discovered and be in pursuit
of an animal, he or she docs not own it nor have a right to it. Possession of lhe animal gives the hunter the
ownership right over the animal, regardless of prior discovcry.
14X Commentators have suggested:
Now property 0\\ nership was introduced t(lr the purpose of presel'\ing equality to this end. in tlld,
that each should enjoy his own. But what is this "own" to which each man has an equal right') ... In Llet, the
"0\\ n" which the laws of property protect i~ \\ hatc\'cr an individual has managed to get hold of, and equality of
right. applied to property, means only that e\'ery man has an equal right to grab. The institution of property was
an agreement among mcn legalizing what each had already grabbed, wJlhout any right to do so, and granting,
for the future, a formal right of ownership to the first grabber. [)\JKI;\t\t\lIc~, SIIJlI'£I note 106, at 4 (quoting
RICHARD SCHLAlII.R, P~I\,\TE PRO"I-.I(!Y: Till' HISIORY OF AN IIJf'\ 130 131 (1951)).
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Additionally, a state must possess or occupy its discovered and claimed
land effectively. Effective possession requires the sovereign to secure "its
position and continually pcrform symbolic acts to indicate its legitimate authority
over that territory. "149 In other words, the sovereign must act like a sovereign and
perfonn the types of acts that sovereigns typically perform.
The requirement of possession through actual or symbolic sovereign acts
has been upheld in the lI-1and ojPa/mos Case. 150 In that case, the Netherlands and
the United States both laid competing claims to the Islands of Palmas. lsi Spain
had discovered and laid claim to the islands in the 1500s,152 and subsequently
ceded them to the United States in I R9R. 153 In the meantime, the Netherlands had
concluded contracts with local rulers, taxed the inhabitants, patrolled the islands
during the Spanish-American War, and provided relief to the island after a
typhoon in 1904; the Netherlands had effectively possessed Palmas.154
Due to these continual and peaceful displays of state authority, the
arbitrator concluded that under customary international law, Netherlands' title
superseded the United States' inchoate title based upon mere discovery and
claim.155 The arbitrator reaffirmed that discovery without actual or symbolic acts
does not perfect title but merely creates an inchoate title. IS!> Although possession

149 Risley.

SIII'/"{/

no Ie 15.

150 Island of Pal111as Case (U.S. v. Neill.). 2 R.I.A.A. 829. 835 36 (1928).
151 Id
152 I". at X44.
153 Id. at X42.
154 Id at 870.
155 Id. at X70 71.
156 Id at 867.
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of the territory docs not require exercise of power everywhere and at every time,
the possession must be ctTectivc. I ';7
Title should vest in the same manner for extratelTestrial regions
as it does under customary international law. Once a state, unilaterally or by
chmier, has discovered and claimed land, the state should be required to
"possess" the territory. Possession should include physical manifestations and
symbolie aets consistent with state sovereignty. These acts could include enacting
municipal laws, appointing administrators, levying taxes, providing eivil dispute
resolution, providing protection from hostile forces, excluding non-citizens, and
other exercises of poliee, administrative, and judicial authority. Although these
manifestations need not occur at every moment and in every region of the
claimed land, they must occur definitively over a prescriptive period. Once
manifestations of sovereignty occur over the prescriptive period, inchoate title
would be perfected, and the state would become a bona fidc owner.
This approach based on principles of customary international law and
traditional property jurisprudence has many benefits over the current COIpltsjllris
.\patialis. A new cO/pus juris "]Ja{ialis should encourage states to govern their

persons in an orderly manner to obtain vested title. This uniform manner of
acquisition would appeal to the world market economy and independent
sovereign states who wish to appropriate extraterrestrial regions. The new corpus
juris spatialis would not require governmental agencies to exercise minute and

exeessive control, thereby reducing administrative costs of space exploration and

157 Id.
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appropriation. Each state would determine, according to its particular needs, the
amount of power that it should exercise, as long as the state manifests definitive,
sovereign acts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Extraterrestrial appropriation no longer remains the exclusive domain of
the state. Private enterprise and its technological advances have changed widely
held paradigms regarding the function and destiny of outer space. This shift is a
result of the ever-increasing potential for private profit.
The current corpus juris spa/ialis, largely contained in the Outer Space
Treaty, conflicts with the idea of private enterprise and actually decreases the
likelihood of space exploration and usc. The common heritage of mankind
principle, underlying this treaty, is based on a res cOl11/11unis theory, which is
antithetical to current economic stimuli and ignores a fundamental desire of
human beings to reap the benefit of the labor they exert. At the time the Outer
Space Treaty was signed, states could not appreciate the opportunities extraterrestrial appropriation would entail and the degree of private participation therein.
Given the fundamental changes in technology as well as the changes in political
and economic climates, this treaty, and others like it, should be abandoned.
Traditional property jurisprudence would make the best foundation for a
new Co/pllS juris spa/ialis. States should establish new territories in space
pursuant to established principles of property jurisprudence: discovery, claim,
and possession. This discovery of celestial bodies should be guided by a charter
system similar to that used in the Age of Discovery. This system should be
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premised on current ideals of property distribution and ensure sutTicient
regulation to maintain a harmonious society.
Ultimately, the issue is whether traditional property jurisprudence is the
best method for regulating and prompting the venture outside the confines of
earth. Of course, just as the current capitalist regime is not perfect, problems with
following traditional propeliy jurisprudence in outer space will inevitably arise.
However, a corpus juris spatia/is based on traditional property jurisprudence is
the best alternative for regulating outer space appropriation.
JOllathull Thomas*

* The author would like to thank Professor Christopher Roederer for his criticisms and suggestions.
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